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Disruptive judgments 
Judith Masson* 
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Abstract 
Disruptive judgments are exercises of judicial power intended to impact on practice. This paper 
discusses the concept of the disruptive case, the practice of making disruptive judgments and the 
processes though which judgments are made disruptive. It uses the Court of Appeal’s decision in Re 
B-S as a case study showing how it has disrupted care proceedings and adoption practice. These 
disruptive effects of Re B-S are illustrated through an examination of case law, reviews, articles, 
published statistics and research findings.  It It also considers how difficult it has been to restore 
clarity subsequently. It concludes by discussing how to prevent judgments from being disruptive:  
improving knowledge of the operation and effects of the family justice system through data; the 
need for interdisciplinary collaboration in developing guidance for practice beyond the court room; 
and the importance for the rule of law of judicial restraint in promulgating guidance.  
Introduction 
This article introduces the concept of the disruptive judgment, which it seeks to define and explore. 
In doing so it examines what makes a judgment disruptive, and how judgments operate to disrupt 
practice in and beyond the legal sphere. At its heart is a case study1 of the Court of Appeal’s decision 
in Re B-S 2 to reject a parent’s appeal against the refusal of her application for leave to oppose the 
adoption of her children.3 Such decisions are usually unremarkable but as is evidenced below, Re B-S 
has been a disruptive case. It has had (and continues to have) a marked impact on adoption practice, 
decision-making in local authority children’s departments, the work of the courts and the futures of 
some children subject to care proceedings.  
There is a rich vein of legal scholarship examining ‘landmark cases’ in various areas of law; typically , 
cases are selected by authors, not the editors, from their personal perspective. Whilst the editors of 
the collection on Family Law do attempt to explain why the selected cases are ‘ landmarks’, this is the 
exception rather than the rule.4 Cases are recognised as landmarks and selected because they 
standout by marking the ‘beginning or end of a chain of legal development’ 5  or its boundaries.6 They 
are the foundations of legal doctrine or have shaped the law, are usually precedents, and their 
position is well-recognised by legal scholars.7 This assessment is made in retrospect, sometimes at a 
considerable distance, for example the most recent case in the volume on restitution is from 1950.8  
                                                                 
*Professor of Socio-legal Studies, University of Bristol. I would like to thank Professors Ann Barlow, Gill ian 
Douglas and Liz Trinder, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier dra ft of this 
article. Also, the University of Bristol, School of Law, which funded the research interviewing local authority 
solicitors which sparked my interest in the immediate effects of Re B-S, and the ESRC Grant ES/M008541/1, 
which has funded my research into Outcomes for Children before and after care proceedings reforms. 
1 L. Mabry (2008) The case study is social research, Thousand Oaks, Sage; R. Yin (2012) Applications of case 
study research, Thousand Oaks, Sage. 
2 [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. 
3 Adoption and Children Act 2002, s.47(5). 
4 S Gilmore, J Herring and R Probert (eds), Landmark cases in Family Law, (Hart, 2016). 
5 Catherine Macmillan in C Mitchell and P Mitchell, (eds ) Landmark cases in the law of contract, (Hart, 2016), p. 
6 John Mee writing about Burns v Burns [1984] Ch 317 in Gilmore et al, (n 4 above). 
7 For example authors in the volume on Contract, (n 5  above) refer to Professor Treitel ’s views. 
8 C Mitchell and P Mitchell, (eds ) Landmark cases in the law of Restitution, (Hart, 2016). 
 2 
 
Landmark cases stand the test of time, either because they continue to be cited as the foundation of 
legal principle or because they hold the key to subsequent developments. In contrast, disruptive 
judgments have immediate impact, and are not firmly grounded in law. 
Many judgments identified as ‘landmarks’ have had little impact initially. This reflects the way much 
of the law operates. Despite past concerns about decisions opening ‘floodgates’ there are numerous 
steps between the creation of a new cause of action and successful claims based on it. Particularly, 
individuals must recognise that law might give redress, seek to do something about it9 and find a 
lawyer who recognises the potential of the original case. According to Williams, Street v Mountford10 
(a landmark land law case on the distinction between leases and licences) remained largely 
unknown, and consequently failed to impact on letting practices.11 Even where a landmark case 
might be expected to have immediate effect its application may proceed more cautiously. Herring 
notes that cases of marital rape were still being prosecuted as assaults after the decision of R v R,12 
and later were marked with lighter sentences because they were considered less serious.13 
Disruptive judgments are ‘game-changing’; they interrupt existing expectations and practice, 
disorient practitioners and result in decisions or outcomes which are  not predicted. Nevertheless, 
they may be welcomed -  the decision is Re B-S has the support of practitioners and academics who 
favour the restriction of adoption.14 ‘Disruptive’ is a contemporary not an historic assessment, based 
on the effect of a decision on day to day practice, even though this may be short-lived.15 Disruptive 
judgments may become landmarks but lack a foundation in law. They have disruptive impact in the 
real world not just the justice system changing many future actions and decisions. Disruption is a 
matter of scale. The breadth of the area effected, the frequency with which the issue arises or the 
sheer volume of work impacted defines such decisions. By contrast, even widely known legal 
landmarks may have only limited impact in practice.  J v C16 provides a good example.  The issue in 
the case, a dispute between parents and carers, remains a relatively uncommon in the courts.  The 
decision passed largely unnoticed at the time.17 Whilst judges deciding landmark cases may be 
unaware of this,18 those giving disruptive judgments cannot be. The judge wants to change the way 
things are done and constructs the judgment to maximise the chances that this will happen.  Indeed, 
it is argued below that delivering a disruptive judgment is an intentional act.  
Landmark cases generally are (or have been) precedents, in contrast status in law is not crucial for 
achieving disruptive effect. Indeed, judges may seek to give disruptive judgments because they are 
cannot make precedent to interpret or re-interpret law as they wish, legitimately. Disruptive 
judgments reveal the judiciary’s assumed power to intervene in policy whilst purportedly working 
                                                                 
9 W Felsteiner, R Abel and A Sarat (1980-81) ‘The emergence and transformation of disputes; naming, blaming 
and claiming’ Law and Society Review 15(3-4) 632-66, H Genn and S Beinart, Paths to justice (Hart, 1999). 
10 [1985] AC 809. 
11 P Will iams, ‘Exclusively yours - a look back at Street v Mountford’ (2014) L. & T. Review, 18(3), 92-95.   
12 [1992] 1 AC 599. 
13 J Herring in Gilmore et al above n 4, 241, citing P Rumney (1999) 19 OLS 243. 
14 For example, A Bainham and H Markham [2014] Fam Law 991–1002; A Gupta and E Lloyd-Jones [2016] Child 
and Family Social Work 539–547; B Sloan [2015] JSWFL 37(4), 437-457.  
15 The case may be overruled e.g. Re W and B [2001] EWCA Civ 757 (the starred care plan case) or overturned 
by statute.  
16 [1970] AC 668. 
17 N Lowe, in Gilmore et al, (n 4 above), 27 notes that the case was not recognised as important, 33.  
18 This is not always the case, for example Lord Denning was obviously intent on changing the approach to 
ancillary relief in Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] Fam 72, and see above G Douglas in Gilmore, Herring and Probert 
(n 4 above), 135, 142. 
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within the limits of interpreting and applying the law.19 Disruptive judges are not constrained by the 
doctrine of precedent and can create change even where existing decisions appear to preclude this. 
Even a powerful dissent may be disruptive if it gains traction and effects practice. 20  Similarly, the 
facts of the case being decided may be relatively unimportant because the impact i s intended to, 
and is presented as, applying more generally.  Rather than relying on reasoning, the traditional tool 
of law-making, judges focus on dicta, soundbites, to set a course for change. The language used, the 
tone and mode of judgment are key tools in the construction of a judgment with disruptive 
potential. Labelling a judgment ‘disruptive’ recognises its immediate success in achieving intended 
change21 and questions its legitimacy in strict legal terms.  
Judging and judgments 
First and foremost a disruptive judgment is a judgment with the power to effect a change of law. 
Other forms of judicial communication, even Practice Directions,22 cannot interpret the law or state 
how it should be applied.  The exercise of judicial power in giving judgment is constrained by the rule 
of law;23  in selecting to deliver a message through a judgment rather than a speech or journal article 
judges both increase its strength and limit its scope. Traditionally, Judges’ powers to develop or 
create law are limited by the requirements of the case they are deciding and the doctrine of 
precedent. However, Munday identified a more dirigiste approach with decisions approximating to a 
‘dilute form of legislation’.24 Guidance judgments are an obvious example. In Piglowska v Piglowski25 
Lord Hoffman explained and endorsed the Court of Appeal’s role in providing general guidance on 
the exercise of discretion, derived from the court’s understanding of family life.26 This mode of 
judgment has becomes a common practice in family law, extending beyond the weighing of factors 
in discretionary decisions to guiding (or directing) decisions more generally.27 Nor has the practice 
been limited to appellate judges.28 The practice of issuing guidance in judgments or ‘guidance 
judgments’ provides opportunities for policy-making, which can blur the boundary between law and 
policy, and questions what are (or should be) the limits to judicial policy-making. 
Giving judgment is a deliberative act. Judges act strategically in choosing the structure, language and 
content of their judgment for deliberate effect. Duncan Kennedy has demonstrated how a judge can 
shape not just an individual decision but the law itself through the focus and construction of their 
judgments, even when another outcome of the case appears certain.29 Judges can and do research 
areas not raised by the parties and base their judgment on the aspects they select to achieve desired 
effects. They have individual responsibility and, even in the Court of Appeal, do much of their work 
                                                                 
19 W. Twining and B Miers, How to do things with rules (5th ed 2010) 354. 
20 For example, Lady Hale’s dissenting judgment in Re B [2013] UKSC 33, a case concerning the threshold test in 
care proceedings and the proportionality of orders made. Although whether the phrase ’nothing else will  do’ 
would have had such an impact without Re B-S [2013] EWCA 1146 can only be a matter of conjecture. 
21 Whether the outcome is viewed positively or negatively depends on the view taken of the impact but the 
method of reform remains questionable. 
22 Constitutional Reform Act 2006, Sched, 3(2)(a). 
23 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (2010), 45. 
24 R Munday, ‘Judicial configurations’ (2002) 61 C.L.J. 612 -656, 612.  
25 [1999] 2 FLR 763 HL. 
26 At 784H 785D but such guidance could not involve value judgments on which judges could reasonably differ.  
27 For example, Munby J gave guidance on the contact regime for a new born baby in Re M [2003] 2 FLR 171, 
and on the use of Children Act 1989, s.20 in Re N [2015] EWCA Civ 1112, in both these cases the guidance was 
not l imited to court practice but extended to social work practice. 
28 R McCarthy, ‘Family Division judgments: what are they for?’ [2012] Family Law 1211, 1214. 
29 Duncan Kennedy, ‘Freedom and constraint in adjudication’ 36 J. Legal Educ. 518 (1986); J Smith and E Til ler 
(2002) ‘The strategy of judging: evidence from administrative law’ J. Legal Studies 31,1 61-82. 
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individually.30 Darbyshire observed the burdens on Court of Appeal judges, constrained by the 
volume of work and the ‘moral pressure’ to get judgments written.31  Draft judgments were 
frequently prepared in advance of oral hearings so they could be delivered at the end with little 
discussion with other members of the panel.32  Single judgments are now common in appeal cases, 
either produced by a single judge or as a composite from those who heard the case.33  The judge 
who gives judgment determines how the decision is explained and the language used. This system of 
individual rather than collective judicial responsibility provides no filter mechanism to deter or 
question the potential for disruption. Such practices weaken the internal checks which may 
constrain judgments, effectively giving powers formally held by the Court of Appeal to individual 
judges.34 
Creating a disruptive judgment starts with the selection of a case as a suitable vehicle.  Most appeals 
to the Court of Appeal require leave;35 applications are reviewed on paper by a single judge and 
those refused can be taken to a hearing. Judges can identify possible cases in advance and control 
which cases enter the appellate system.36 The supervising Lord (or Lady) Justice for each type of 
specialist appeal decides who judges important cases.37 This system means that that the judiciary, 
individually and sometimes collectively control the cases heard by the Court of Appeal, who hears 
those cases and who writes the judgment. In some cases, for example Re R,38 they also exert 
substantial influence over the selection of cases where leave to appeal is sought. Through this 
process Lord Justice Wall gathered a group of contact cases, Re L, M, V, H (contact: Domestic 
Violence),39 so that the Court of Appeal could issue a judgment enshrining guidance based on the 
advice of a committee he had chaired.40 Despite careful preparation, which included obtaining 
expert evidence, this decision has had little effect,41 underlining the crucial role of context for 
making a disruptive judgment. A study of disruptive judgments is therefore a study of judgments in 
context, analysing the judgment itself, the circumstances in which it was given and its effect.  
Case Study: Re B-S42 
The case of Re B-S provides a signal example of the disruption a judgment can cause and the 
mechanisms through which this occurs. Indeed, studying the way the case was used and referred to 
                                                                 
30 Sitting together to hear cases is the exception, P Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment Hart (2011), chap 14. 
31 Darbyshire, (n 30 above), 354. 
32 Darbyshire, (n 30 above), chap 14. 
33 R Munday, ‘“All for one and one for all” the rise to prominence of the composite judgment within the civil  
division of the Court of Appeal’ (2002) 61 C.L.J 321-50. 
34 McCarthy’s concerns about guidance judgments from individual High Court judges, see, (n 28 above), 1214 
are apposite. 
35 Civil  Procedure Rules, r.52.3. Leave can be granted by the lower court but the practice is for this  decision to 
be left to the Court of Appeal. 
36  This routinely occurs where the leave application and substantive appeal are heard together, see Re D 
[2015] EWCA Civ 703 para 40. 
37 Darbyshire, (n 30 above), 345. This process allows the President of the Family Division to select the cases 
which he hears. 
38 Re R [2014] EWCA Civ 1625, n 147 below and accompanying text. 
39 [2001] Fam 260 
40 I am indebted to Professor Liz Trinder for these details. 
41 R Hunter and A Barnett (2013) Fact-Finding Hearings and the Implementation of the President's Practice 
Direction: Residence and Contact Cases: Domestic Violence and Harm Family Justice Council . 
42 [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. 
 5 
 
by practitioners first alerted me to the power of judgments to have an immediate and disruptive 
effect.43  
The case involved an unsuccessful appeal by a mother against a decision to refuse her leave to 
oppose the adoption of her child. However, the judgment went beyond the decision on the case; the 
President of the Family Division, Sir James Munby, giving the judgment of the court set out detailed 
requirements for social work evidence and court judgments in care proceedings.  Practice in 
adoption is well-documented, the numbers of children entering and leaving care by adoption are 
routinely published, making possible the examination of impact not only through legal literature, 
(unrepresentative) reported cases but also statistically, in terms of the change in applications and 
orders. Alternative cases might have been selected;44  Re N45 similarly employed the tone and mode 
of the judgment to make a point unconnected to the decision. Others familiar with practice beyond 
family law will no doubt identify other examples, and further mechanisms for making judgments 
disruptive. 
The judgment in Re B-S 
Everything about the judgment in Re B-S gave the impression of its importance. It was a composite 
judgment by the Master of the Rolls, the President of the Family Division and the Head of 
International Family Justice. Leave to appeal had been given by the next most senior family judge in 
the Court of Appeal, explicitly in response to a decision of the Supreme Court, Re B.46 The problem it 
sought to address appeared serious, current and portrayed as widespread, raising issues of human 
rights. It was of the utmost importance for the mother and child concerned, with the potential to 
change the course of their lives.47 The language used in the judgment was trenchant and the 
direction it gave uncompromising, not simply guidance but ‘principles’ for ‘the proper approach.’48 In 
this context, it seems that the judgment was intended to produce change – to swing the family 
justice pendulum in favour of parents at a point when the impending restriction on expert 
assessments and case duration was seen as disadvantaging them.49 
However, Re B-S was not a very suitable vehicle:50 the points made so strongly in the judgment were 
not reflected in the decision being appealed. The court could not therefore provide examples of 
what was wrong; indeed, the judgment declared that the judge at first instance had been ‘right’ to 
refuse leave to oppose the adoption and the appeal was dismissed.  The general points on social 
work evidence and the structure of judgments were all obiter; the specific points on the test for 
leave had been decided by the Court of Appeal in 2008 in a judgment that Re B-S did not (and could 
not) overrule.51 The decision and reasoning were very short, covering just three and a half pages of 
                                                                 
43 Interviews with local authority lawyers in the three months after the decision see: J Masson, ‘Third (or 
fourth) time lucky for care proceedings reform?’ [2015] CFLQ 3. 
44  P v Cheshire West and Chester Council and another [2012] UKSC 68 was suggested; deprivation of l iberty is 
the subject of a recent Law Commission Report, Law Com No 372 (2017). Munby P’s dicta in Re N [2015] EWCA 
Civ 1112 appears to have contributed to the substantial increase in care proceedings but Hackney LBC v 
Williams [2017] EWCA Civ 26 has made it clear that these do not re-interpret Children Act 1989, s.20. 
45 [2015] EWCA Civ 1112. 
46 [2013] UKSC 33, see Re B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 813, paras 9, 18-24, per McFarlane LJ, granting leave to appeal. 
47 See, for example what could have happened had the decision favoured the mother: A and B v Rotherham 
MBC [2014] EWFC 47 (Fam). 
48 Paras 74 and 75. 
49 The Children and Families Act 2014 reforms were being piloted in advance of Royal Assent. 
50 This was also the case in the ‘corrective’ judgment in Re R [2014] EWCA Civ 1625, see n 148 below and 
accompanying text. 
51 Re P (Adoption: Leave Provisions) [2007] EWCA Civ 616, a well -known and widely cited decision. 
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the judgment.  Each of the appeal grounds was summarily rejected and Parker J’s decision, though 
not without minor errors, was upheld. Put another way, despite a Supreme Court decision, which 
had justified the Re B-S appeal and its assertion of a less restrictive approach to applications for 
revocation, a decision made before Re B to reject such an application was upheld in short order. 
That being so, the need for another judgment was questionable. Re B had not required a new 
approach to these cases.  Stating this would have neutralised the judgment’s potential to disrupt. As 
it was, the disjunction between the case and the judgment, between ratio and dicta created 
confusion,52  and this was magnified by the way the decision was disseminated and revisited. What 
was subsequently agreed to be only ‘practice guidance’ was treated by judges and practitioners as 
law to justify appeals where decisions had not met the desired standard.53 
Had the judgment in Re B-S simply reminded local authority applicants and the judiciary of the 
importance of explaining, with evidence, the selection and rejection of placement options for the 
child and providing a fully reasoned judgment it would not have had a disruptive effect. However, it 
went much further, condemning past practice as ‘sloppy’,54 giving a clear message that previous 
practice was not good enough, ‘time to call a halt’55, and consequently suggesting that earlier 
decisions may have been wrong. It set out how social workers and judges should approach their 
tasks in terms of content, process and format; there had to be ‘a holistic’ not ‘linear’56 evaluation of 
‘all realistic placement options’57, comparing each with the others. Judges were directed on the 
importance of considering all the pros and all the cons of allowing or refusing the parents leave to 
oppose the adoption, and reminded ‘not to attach undue weight to the short-term consequences for 
the child if leave is given’.58 The adverse effect of a contested adoption on the adopters could be 
dealt with by ‘firm judicial case management’ before the leave hearing.59 This was not a judgment 
that simply reminded judges to apply the statutory tests conscientiously, it added further layers and 
a specific approach.60 Effectively,  it set out a checklist of possible appeal points for challenging  
refusal to revoke a placement order61 or give leave to oppose adoption.  
Judgments need support and application to become disruptive. All judgments become stronger and 
more noteworthy when they are supported by other judgments, and particularly where they 
become the foundation for a new way of thinking about an issue or provision. 62 A single case, even 
from the Court of Appeal, may always be side-lined as limited to its facts. W v Neath Port Talbot 
                                                                 
52  ‘Such was the level of misunderstanding … that a year later the Court of Appeal gave further guidance’  Re N 
(ICO interim removal) [2015] EWFC 40, para 75. Interviews with local authority lawyers in the weeks after Re B-
S revealed considerable difference of opinion about its effect, see n 43, and below n 102, and accompanying 
text.    
53 See, The impact of Re B-S, below. 
54 Para 40. 
55 Para 30. 
56 Para 43, quoting from McFarlane LJ’s judgment in Re G [2013] EWCA Civ 913. 
57 Paras 34 and 35 (but note in para 27 the phrase ‘all  options’ was used).  The difficulty with focusing on 
‘realistic options’ unless these are agreed, failure to consider any option may ground an appeal.  
58 This is a puzzling point. Only where granting leave makes no difference to outcome can its effects be short-
term, see Masson [2014] JSWFL 82-84. In making this statement, Munby P quoted from Re O [1995] 2 FLR 124, 
a private law case about indirect contact, where refusal would not prevent a future application. 
59 Para 74(ix). 
60 This is in marked contrast to the law of relocation where the Court of Appeal has urged a return to the 
welfare test, removing judicial accretions, Re F [2015] EWCA Civ 882. 
61 Adoption and Children Act s. 24(2), see para 84. 
62 This was the approach taken by Lord Denning in his development of the Common Law see A Denning, The 
Discipline of Law (1979).  
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County Borough Council,63 an appeal by a local authority against a care order, which it considered 
unnecessary and disproportionate, provided the opportunity for a supporting judgment from a 
differently constituted court in a different factual context. The Neath and Port Talbot case had been 
heard shortly before Re B-S but the judgment was given weeks later, in October 2013. It served to 
buttress and expand the scope of Re B-S. Ryder LJ, who delivered the main judgment, took the 
opportunity to explain how his judgment meshed with the reasoning in Re B-S, and set out the 
expansive powers of the courts in care proceedings together with the local authority’s obligation to 
satisfy them. Munby P gave a short, concurring judgment, ‘[Ryder LJ’s] judgment explains and 
elucidates the respective functions of the court and the local authority in care cases.   It 
complements the recent judgment in Re B-S…’64 
Three of the specialist family judges in the Court of Appeal had now put their names to the Re B-S 
approach,65 which was extended beyond the niche area of adoption to care proceedings more 
generally. They had also approved the decision of a fourth, McFarlane LJ in Re G66 requiring a 
‘holistic’ approach to analysing options for the child’s care. The list of appeal points had grown; 
options for placement at home or with relatives now had to indicate the services the local authority 
would provide, and why these were (or were not) sufficient for the child’s welfare. The courts had 
not previously claimed successfully that the family jurisdiction extended to determining the 
provision of local authority services.67 
Making judgments disruptive 
Disruptive judgments must have impact, ‘a marked effect or influence’68 on everyday practice, 
including on legal advice, claims and decisions in areas of law with substantial numbers of cases . The 
first requirement therefore is that they become widely known. Munby P sought to achieve this both 
with the language of the judgment and through dissemination. He later commented, that the 
language was ‘deliberately strong…we did not mince our words.’69  In the words of a local authority 
senior manager it was ‘a massive edict.’70  The President’s Office immediately emailed the judgment 
to all Designated Family Judges for onward circulation71 - this was unprecedented. It ensured that 
local authority lawyers, lawyers in private practice, solicitors and barristers in each family court area 
knew of the case. The President referred to it in the next edition of View from the President’s 
Chambers in case anyone had missed it, 
‘Finally, before departing from the recent case-law may I emphasise the importance for 
all family practitioners, whatever their professional  discipline, of the decision in Re B-S 
(Children) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. The Court of Appeal voiced serious concerns and 
                                                                 
63 [2013] EWCA Civ 1228. 
64 W v Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council [2013] EWCA Civ 1228 at para 115. 
65 By the end of October 2013 all  the family judges in the Court of Appeal except Gloster LJ had delivered 
substantive judgments applying Re B-S. 
66 [2013] EWCA Civ 965. 
67 Re S [2002] UKHL 10; Pack, A ‘W v Neath Port Talbot – courts local  authorities and a Mexican standoff’ 
Family Law Week 17th November 2013 available at http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed120970 
 (31st July 2017). 
68 Oxford English Dictionary definition.  
69 J. Munby, Keynote speech to Families Need Fathers AGM, 14 th November 2014. 
70 Research in Practice, (2016) The impact of the Family Justice Reforms: Phase 3 – exploring variation across 21 
local authorities, Department for Education RR 546, 84. 
71 This has been done with a few subsequent cases, notably Re N [2015] EWCA Civ 1112 (see above n 44); the 
corrective Hackney case [2017] EWCA Civ 26 was circulated only by the Local Government Care Lawyers 
Group.  
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misgivings about how courts are approaching cases where a placement order or 
adoption order is made without parental consent …. And that practice, to speak plainly, 
has not been satisfactory.’72 
Within days of being published the judgment became the subject of comment in the legal press and 
blogs, raising the possibility of new appeals.73  A torrent of cases74 followed, which attracted further 
publicity; there were more applications to revoke placement orders and to appeal cases decided 
previously. The Re B-S standard was applied to appeals of decisions made months earlier, reinforcing 
the impression that it was law (with retrospective effect) not simply new guidance for the future.75  
Timing matters; judgments are more likely to have impact if they are published at a point where the 
legal community is receptive to change and seeking to develop the law. Re B-S was expertly timed; 
leave to appeal was give two days after the Supreme Court’s decision in Re B and the case was heard 
only five weeks later, a very short wait even allowing for the priority given to cases involving 
children. The judgment too was well-timed, delivered promptly,76 at the start of the legal term, 
rather than shortly before the vacation when the case was heard. This timing emphasised the case’s 
potential importance: it was a considered response to Re B, delivered without delay to prepare the 
lower courts for this latest development.  
The context in which a judgment is issued can increase or diminish interest in it, and thus the 
potential to disrupt. The decision in Re B-S appeared at a time of heightened concern amongst family 
lawyers about justice for families and the future for lawyers who relied on legal aid funding. This 
may go some way to explain the alacrity with which lawyers explored the opportunities the case 
provided. The imposition of the 26 week timetable for care proceedings, recommended by the 
Family Justice Review, and the government’s promotion of adoption for children in care raised 
questions about how parents’ rights could be secured procedurally and substantively. The 
shortening of care proceedings by more than half would reduce parents’ opportunities to 
demonstrate change once care proceedings had started; the restriction of expert appointments also 
limited the parents’ lawyers’ options in challenging the local authority’s case.77 Reforms introduced 
by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 were limiting access to justice, 
reducing legal work and cutting fees.78 In excess of £170 million of public funding for legal advice and 
representation in family cases had been removed by taking most areas of family law out of the scope 
of legal aid. Parents and children in care proceedings still had the right to non-means, non-merits 
legal aid but legal representation in other areas of family law depended on privately paying clients. 
Lawyers reliant on public funding faced cuts to their fees and needed to develop new areas of 
                                                                 
72 View from the President’s Chambers, No. 7 (October 2013) available at 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/view-from-presidents-chambers/ (last viewed 24th March 2017). 
73 New Law Journal 20th September 2013; http://www.magdalenchambers.co.uk/court-appeal-case-re-b-s-
children-2013-ewca-civ-1146/ (8th October 2013); 
http://www.wwwparentsagainstinjusticeorguk.com/2013/10/re-b-s-children-2013-ewca-civ-1146.html (21st 
October 2013); http://www.parentsaccused.co.uk/time-to-call-a-halt-to-sloppy-practice-in-adoption-cases/ 
(16th October 2013). 
74 A Verdan and P Harries in a paper published on 26 th September 2013 commented, ‘Re B-S has huge and 
wide-ranging implications and is already being referred to in family courts up and down the country.’ 
http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed117472  (24th March 2017). 
75 Re H; Re W [2013] EWCA Civ 1177. 
76 In contrast, Munby P issued his decision and judgment in Re N [2015] EWCA Civ 1112 seven months after the 
case was heard. 
77 Pearce et al (2012) Just following Instructions? School of Law, University of Bristol. 
78 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, had been implemented on 1 st April  2013. 
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work.79 Lawyers were critical of Review’s proposals because they saw them as weakening the 
position of parents and children. In evidence to the House of Commons Justice Committee, Th e 
Family Law Bar Association stated, ‘the forthcoming reduction in the scope of legal aid for children 
work heightens our concern that justice is being compromised by the imposition of an arbitrary time 
limit.’80 Opportunities to develop practice by challenging decisions for parents after the end of care 
proceedings were welcome. They could help to redress the system in favour of (birth) families and 
offer the possibility of work, which could still be funded on a means and merits-tested basis.  
Spring and summer of 2013 were a period of great activity as agencies and professionals prepared 
for the implementation of the care proceedings reforms.81 In early 2013, local authorities and 
Cafcass had jointly issued a good practice guide for court work stating, ‘social work reports should 
always be focused, analytical and evidence based.’82 New templates for social work evidence and 
children’s guardian’s case analyses were developed for the Public Law Outline (PLO)83 but after Re B-
S it was unclear whether these would be considered adequate. They contained no reference to ‘a 
balance sheet approach’ for setting out the pros and cons of options for the child’s care.84 Whilst the 
guidance, forms and training on them had been designed to ensure work of a sufficient standard, 
social workers had not been trained in the closely-defined structure which Re B-S now required. 
Over the next few months local authority lawyers reviewed the case law, many issued 
supplementary guidance and evidence templates were revised. The timing of Re B-S was disruptive, 
particularly for local authorities which had already undertaken substantial staff training for the PLO. 
Whilst preparation was not entirely wasted, more work was required to meet the court’s new 
demands; authorities that had prepared in advance for the PLO were penalised for good planning.  
Judges were also concerned about the reform of care proceedings, and to make these reforms work. 
Before Re B-S the standards of judicial decision-making had not been seen as problematic; indeed, 
senior judges had given evidence to the Adoption Committee to this effect. 85 Concerns centred on 
weak case management leading the over-use of experts and excessive case length; Judicial College 
training on the new approach to care proceedings in the spring of 2013 focussed on these.86 Judges 
were given an ‘uncompromising’ direction by the President of the Family Division on what was 
expected of them in terms of completing cases in 26 weeks. ‘This deadline can be met, it must be 
met, it will be met.’87 The quality and format of judgments was not seen as an issue and did not form 
part of the training; judgments could continue to be given orally at the end of the case, rather than 
                                                                 
79 Ministry of Justice. Consultations on Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bil l  - Annex A: 
Scope. London, UK: Ministry of Justice, 2011; 39% of family barristers at the self-employed bar reported a 
decline in income: Bar Standards Board, Barrister’s Working Lives (2013). 
80 House of Commons Justice Committee, Pre-legislative scrutiny of the Children and Families Bill (2012-13 HC 
739), Written evidence from the Family Law Bar Association (CFB 34). 
81 Masson (2015) (n 43 above). 
82 Cafcass and ADCS (the Association for Directors of Children’s Services , Good practice guidance for social 
work in the family courts (April  2013), 3.2. 
83 The court process for completing care proceedings within 26 weeks. 
84 Re B-S para 74 (iv). 
85 House of Lords Select Committee on Adoption, Second Report 2012-13, Post-legislative Scrutiny of the 
Adoption (2012-13 HL 127), McFarlane and Ryder LJJ, (nn 112, 121 below). 
86 For an outline of the training see Ryder LJ, oral evidence to House of Commons Justice Committee, Pre-
Legislative Scrutiny of the Children and Families Bill (2012-13 HC 739) 20th November 2012, Q62. 
87 Munby P, The View from the President’s Chambers No 1, April  2013. 
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in writing, later.88 To ensure the 26 week timetable operated effectively, the President established a 
national pilot commencing between July and October 2013 in each Family Justice Area. 
It was only after the decisions in Re B-S and Re W; Re H,89 (where Re B-S was applied), that the 
exacting standard required for judgments was made clear. These cases challenged the existing 
perception, reinforced in training, that implementing the PLO was only about working more 
efficiently and avoiding delay. The tone of these judgments made it clear that past practice had been 
inadequate and higher standards of judging were required, particularly if the plan in care 
proceedings was adoption. Indeed, the Court of Appeal indicated that the 26 week rule did not apply 
where the court is ‘not properly equipped to decide these issues.’90  Whilst the training had been 
designed to convince judges that the 26 week timetable was achievable and fair to parents, these 
cases challenged judicial confidence in past decisions and judge’s ability to do justice.91  It became 
clear that decisions adverse to parents in care proceedings would be subject to increased scrutiny.  
The impact of Re B-S 
The impact of Re B-S was immediate: appeals were allowed, cases sent for rehearing, applications 
for care and placement orders were refused; there was a marked decline in care plans for these 
orders and an increase in other types of orders, with and without local authority support.  The case 
was applied in five cases in the Court of Appeal in October 2013 alone, and cited in another. In three, 
care and placement orders were over-turned and the cases remitted for rehearing; appeals were 
granted in two other cases where leave to oppose adoption had been refused. Only one appeal was 
refused.92 This pace was maintained: Westlaw lists 18 cases in 2013, 12 in the Court of Appeal and 
six in the High Court, where the case was mentioned in the judgment or applied. In addition, there 
were appeals from magistrates or district judges to Circuit Judges - these are rarely reported93 and 
not recorded in the published court statistics. New judgments from the Court of Appeal, given or 
supported by Munby P, glossed and extended the original decision;94 he acknowledged that 
allowance could be made for judgments delivered before Re B-S, but the Court must be satisfied the 
‘judge's approach as it appears from the judgment engage[d] with the essence [of Re B-S].’ 95 This 
narrow concession did not re-orient appeals towards substance rather than structure; appeals were 
                                                                 
88 Oral judgments did prove problematic for the appeals process, see below. Munby P subsequently made clear 
that more judgments should be published on Baili i, Practice Guidance, Transparency in the Family Courts 16th 
January 2014. 
89 Re W; Re H [2013] EWCA Civ 1177. 
90 A Verdan and N. Harries, ‘Time to call  a halt New Court of Appeal Guidance in Adoption Cases: Re B-S [2013] 
EWCA Civ 813’ (sic) Family Law Week 26/9/2013, citing the judgment para 49. 
91 In Re W, HHJ Bond’s careful and detailed judgment had failed to explain exactly why the application was 
refused, para 44; in Re H, HHJ Barclay’s judgment was described as ‘thin, very thin’ and he did not appear to 
have used the correct formula in setting out the test for leave, para 40. Both these judges had contributed to 
judicial training, HHJ Bond as a course director and HHJ Barclay as a tutor judge. 
92 Re W; Re H [2013] EWCA Civ 1177; W (A Child) v Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council  [2013] EWCA Civ 
1227; Re Y [2013] EWCA Civ 1337; Re E [2013] EWCA Civ 1614; Re C [2013] EWCA Civ 1259 (appeal refused). 
93 See: J Doughty, A Twaite and P Magrath, (2017) Transparency the publication of family court judgments, 
Cardiff University. There is a second appeal to the Court of Appeal, this path was taken in BP v Herts CC [2014] 
EWCA Civ 1524 (leave to appeal was refused by the Court of Appeal) and in Re B; MB v Staffordshire CC [2014] 
EWCA Civ 565, where the circuit judge had attempted unsuccessfully to ensure sufficient reasons. 
94 Re W; Re H [2013] EWCA Civ 1177; W (A Child) v Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council  [2013] EWCA Civ 
1227 (n 64 and accompanying text). 
95 Re W; Re H [2013] EWCA Civ 1177. 
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allowed because the judge had taken the ‘traditional’ linear approach,96 considering proposals 
sequentially, starting with re-unification, reaching adoption having ruled out everything else,97 and 
on the basis that a short judgment, referring simply to the judge’s acceptance of the Cafcass 
guardian’s reasons, could not be adequate.98 The Court of Appeal did not seek to limit the flow of 
cases by requiring appellants first to seek clarification from the judge at first instance, which is the 
expected approach in family cases.99  Appeals generated more appeals as the court found fault with 
lower court judgments and appeared willing to grant leave.  
The published court statistics show an increase in family appeals to the Court of Appeal from 135 in 
2012 to 179 in 2014, declining to 155 in 2015. Details are not provided of the subject of these 
appeals but analysis of the judgments on Bailii, which account for at least two-thirds of family 
appeals at this level found public child law made up half of reported appeals in 2013, compared with 
45% in 2012 and 41% in 2014. Although not conclusive, these data suggest that Re B-S was 
contributed to the increase in family appeals. In 2013 and 2014, the Court of Appeal Court received 
more applications than it could hear. The subsequent decline decisions illustrates the difficulty 
judges had, coping with the workload and publishing judgments in a timely way. 
The difficulties experienced in the Court of Appeal were highlighted in the judgment of Black LJ in 
the case of Re R 100 an appeal against care and placement orders on the basis that the judgment was 
inadequately reasoned. 
‘This case is illustrative of an increasing problem faced by this court. More and more 
litigants appear in front of us in person. Where, as here, the appellant is unrepresented, 
this requires all those involved in the appeal process to take on burdens that they would 
not normally have to bear. The court office finds itself having to attempt to make sure 
that the parties to the litigation are notified of the appeal... The bundles that the court 
requires in order to determine the appeal are often not provided by the litigant, or are 
incomplete, and proper papers have to be assembled by the court, not infrequently at 
the request of the judges …The grounds of appeal that can properly be advanced have 
to be identified by the judge … and the arguments in support of them may have to be 
pinpointed by the court hearing the appeal. The court has no extra resources to 
respond to these added challenges.’101 
Black LJ’s proposed solution that local authority respondents should take on responsibility for 
preparing hearing bundles was oblivious to the pressure demands arising from Re B-S 
(including appeals) were having on them. 
                                                                 
96  In Re C [2013] EWCA Civ 1259, McFarlane LJ refused a disappointed relative’s appeal despite the original 
judge’s l inear approach but maintained his view of the importance of holistic reasoning.  
97 A. Pack, ‘Judicial Window Dressing and Balance Sheets – Where is adoption post-Re B-S?’ Family Law Week 
11/10/13 pointed out that this reflected the Supreme Court’s exhortation (in Hale B’s dissenting judgment) to 
treat adoption as a last resort. McFarlane L J subsequently deplored the use of the ‘last resort’ dictum as a 
‘hyperlink’ to a decision: Re W [2016] EWCA Civ 793 at para 68. 
98 Re N-D [2014] EWCA Civ 1226 Ryder LJ contrasted the length of the hearing (6 days with the brevity of the 
judgment, which was inadequate as a basis for care and placement orders. The parents had  been convicted of 
extreme physical abuse of their eldest child. The judge did not detail  the evidence but merely said which she 
accepted it.  
99 Re M (Children) [2008] EWCA Civ 1261; Family Procedure Rules, Practice Direction 30A provides for parties 
or the Court of Appeal to seek clarification from the lower court. 
100 Re R [2014] EWCA Civ 597. 
101 Re R per Black LJ at paras 6-7, emphasis in original.  
 12 
 
The Court of Appeal was clearly not prepared for the volume of appeals. There were very substantial 
delays in hearing them and giving judgment. Most successful appeals against care and placement 
orders resulted in cases being remitted for rehearing, incurring further delay in the implementation 
of any plan for the child. For cases decided before the PLO, these delays generally came after long 
proceedings, compounding the period of limbo for the child. In later cases, the gains achieved 
through the PLO were more than cancelled out by the time taken simply waiting for a decision from 
the Court of Appeal.102  
The impact was not limited to family matters. The volume of children cases contributed to the need 
for wider changes in the Court of Appeal. The ‘hear by dates’ were extended. Children cases still 
have the shortest waiting times but most appellants can expect to wait longer, with substantial 
increases for appeals against final orders in all other civil and family cases.103 Access to the Court of 
Appeal has been restricted for some family cases but appeals in care and adoption matters.104  
At Family Court level, local authority lawyers reported immediate difficulties getting care plans 
approved and obtaining placement orders. They applied various strategies to ensure cases were ‘Re 
B-S compliant’: submitting additional social work statements containing a balance sheet; using oral 
evidence to highlight the pros and cons of the different options; and asking social workers to amend 
care plans if they could not evidence that adoption was the only solution in the child’s welfare , the 
child would be difficult to place or a relative was offering care. There were more, and more vigorous, 
contestations of care plans by parents and children’s guardians.105 Social workers and managers 
were thought to be shying away from adoption plans because of the difficulties posed by satisfying 
the court.106  The assessment of relative carers was problematic because of the staff time taken by 
multiple assessments and delays caused by assessments, ordered late in proceedings. Social workers 
reported that they felt they had to explore every option and complete in-depth assessments, even 
on relatives who appeared unsuitable at the outset, to prevent difficulties in court.107  Courts were 
requiring additional assessments in proceedings.108 All this had to be done to exacting standards in 
limited time. Re B-S made the court process even more daunting for social workers.  109 
Thorough preparation did not ensure that applications for placement orders were successful. 
Following the decision in Re B-S, the number of children for whom plans changed away from 
adoption more than doubled, from 690 in 2012 to 1470 in 2014. Change in children’s needs and 
inability to find adopters have always led local authorities to abandon adoption plans. However after 
Re B-S, these cases were almost equalled by changes as a result of the court’s refusal to make, or 
                                                                 
102 Re R [2014] EWCA Civ 597 had taken 11 months at first instance and took another 9 months for the appeal 
(case remitted). In Re K, KT [2014] EWCA Civ 1211 12 months passed before the Court of Appeal held there 
was no substance in any point. It is not possible to produce statistics on appeal delays because the relevant 
dates (the order and application for leave etc) are not routinely included in judgments. 
103 Practice Guidance, Court of Appeal (Civil  Division) Hear-by dates, 3 July 2015. 
104  Appeals from circuit judges or recorders now go to a High Court judge from the Family Division: Access to 
Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals) (Family Proceedings) (Amendment) Order 2016 (2016 SI 891) art 2. A 
200% increase in family appeals to the Court of Appeal between 2008 and 2015 is given as one reason for the 
change, Explanatory Memorandum, para 7. 
105 Research in Practice (2016), (n 70 above), pp 74-75; Masson, (n 43 above), pp 20-21. 
106 P Bentley, ‘Continuing conflicts in adoption law and policy’ 24 (2014) Seen and Heard 26, 32. 
107 Ipsos Mori (2014), Action research to explore the implementation and early impacts of the revised Public 
Law Outline (PLO), Ministry of Justice, p.18. 
108 Research in Practice (2016), (n 70 above), pp 47 and 75. 
109 Research in Practice (2015), The impact of family justice reforms on front line practice Phase 1: The Public 
Law Outline, Department for Education RR 478A. 
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revocation of, placement orders.110 Local authorities could no longer predict accurately the court’s 
response to placement applications.111 Contrary to Ryder LJ’s evidence to the Select Committee in 
November 2012, refusal of placement orders was no longer a ‘very rare event.’112  Refusals increased 
more than fourfold, from an average of 50 per year from 2009 to 2012 to an average of 240 per year 
in 2014 and 2016, see Figure 1.113 This increase occurred despite a reduction in the number of 
applications.  
Figure 1: Change of children’s plans away from adoption 2009-2015 
 
The impact of Re B-S on the overall numbers of placement orders was very pronounced, see Figure 
2. The number of placement orders declined sharply, almost halving in the 12 months following the 
decision in Re B-S.114 As is clear from Figure 1, this was not simply due to an increase in refusals by 
the courts, local authorities also made fewer applications. In a study by Masson and colleagues, 
adoption plans were only accepted for the youngest children, excluding adoption for almost all 
children aged over two years when care proceedings concluded.115 
                                                                 
110 Revocations are included in ‘any other reason’ in the Adoption Statistics and not separately identified in the 
court statistics. 
111 Variation between areas increased, with some local authorities continuing to obtain placement orders 
whilst others did not, for further details see the Report of the Outcomes for Children Study ES/M008541/1 
(forthcoming, 2018). 
112 Ryder LJ, evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Adoption Legislation, (2012 -13 HL 127), 
Q790. 
113 Source of data: Department for Education, Children looked after by local authorities including adoption , 
table E4 (published annually). 
114 Sources of data: Adoption Leadership Board statistics, published quarterly http://bit.ly/1P7gcuN ; Cafcass 
care demand statistics http://bit.ly/1FZsM5R  (29th March 2017). 
115 Findings from the ESRC funded Outcomes for Children Study (n 111 above). 
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Figure 2: Care proceedings (children) and placement orders 2011-12 to 2015-16      
 
Applications for leave to oppose adoptions also increased.116 One designated Family Judge reported 
to their local family justice board that 20 per cent of his sitting time was committed to hearing these 
cases, which were often ‘hopeless’ and ‘caused misery’ for all concerned. He proposed that this work 
should be allocated to magistrates.117 If these figures were replicated elsewhere, Re B-S had imposed 
substantial demands on judicial time. In a small number of cases, courts were faced with competing 
applications for adoption and placement with family members.118 Such cases are ‘harrowing…and 
cause intense grief’119 because the judge faces the choice between removing a child from the 
prospective adopter’s care and denying him or her a childhood being raised  in the ‘natural family’.120 
The emotional toll of such proceedings disrupts the lives of those involved whatever the outcome. 
Placement orders, one of the ‘real boons of the system’ ,121 had been designed to achieve a fair 
assessment of adoption plans without pitting birth families against adopters. Allowing adoption 
                                                                 
116 These are not separately reported in the court statistics. 
117 DFJ Wildblood, Bristol Family Court, 18 th June 2015. 
118 Only reported cases can be identified: A and B v Rotherham MBC [2014] EWFC 47 (Fam); Re SR [2014] 
EWHC 1777 (birth parents from Re W [2013] EWCA Civ 1177 unsuccessful in opposing adoption); Re LG (A 
Child) [2015] EWFC 52; Re M’P-P [2015] EWCA Civ 584, reheard as Re B and E [2015] EWFC B203 children to 
remain with foster carer/ adopter; Re W [2015] EWHC 2039 (Fam), reversed on appeal:  Re H [2015] EWCA Civ 
1284 and finally resulting in an adoption order Re W [2017] EWHC 829; Re W [2016] EWCA Civ 793 appeal 
allowed, adoption granted: Re W [2016] EWHC 3118 (Fam); London Borough of X v KD [2016] EWFC B54 special 
guardianship to grandparent granted; Re RA [2016] EWFC 47 adoption granted. 
119 A and B v Rotherham MBC [2014] EWFC 47 (Fam), per Holman J at para 1. 
120 Re W [2016] EWCA Civ 793 McFarlane LJ repeatedly used this phrase in relation to placement with relatives. 
121 McFarlane LJ, evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Adoption Legislation (2012 -13 HL 127), 
Q787.  
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placements to be overturned at a late stage, undermined the process in the Adoption and Children 
Act 2002 and ‘constitute[d] a sea change’ in approach.122  As a consequence, some children in care 
might lose the chance of a ‘forever family’  if potential adopters were discouraged by the possibility 
of such conflicts.123  The government responded by including a clause in the Children and Social 
Work Bill to recognise the relationship between children and their prospective adopters.124 
There was no immediate decline in the number of adoptions because of the time l ag between 
granting placement orders and adoption. However, reduction in numbers of placement orders 
impacted on the Adoption Register, which helps to identify potential placements. Whereas the 
register had always held details of more children requiring adoptive placements than prospective 
adopters, by August 2014 the position was reversed. There was a sharp decline in children referred 
because local authorities needed to find fewer adoptive homes; at the same time, a recruitment 
drive for adopters, under the Government’s Adoption strategy increased the pool of potential 
adopters. The imbalance which had resulted in children waiting for placements was reversed; now 
prospective adopters were the ones waiting, see Figure 3.   
Figure 3: Children and adopters on the Adoption Register November 2013- June 2016 
 
Alongside the decline in placement orders there was an increase in other orders, particularly special 
guardianship and supervision.125 The number of children leaving care through special guardianship 
orders increased by 22 per cent between 2012-13 and 2013-14 and a further five per cent the 
                                                                 
122 J Tughan (2015) ‘Public law update’ http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed146825  (29 March 
2017). 
123 Research in Practice (2016) (n 70 above), p. 74, mentioned by 2 of 21 local authorities. 
124 Cl. 9, now s.9. Before the Bill  was enacted the decision in Re W [2016] EWCA Civ 793 recognised that 
prospective adopters had rights under ECHR, art 8. 
125 Special Guardianship Orders (CA 1989, s. 14A-F) gives parental responsibility (PR) to someone other than 
their parents and severely curtail s parents’ PR; these are intended to be permanent. Supervision orders (CA 
1989, s. 35) place a child under the supervision of the local authority, initially for a maximum of 12 months and 
are the most l imited form of state intervention.   
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following year.126 The proportion of special guardianship orders with supervision orders increased 
from 11 per cent in 2010-11 to 29 per cent in 2014-15.127 A greater number of children finding a 
permanent home in their extended family is to be welcomed but anecdotal evidence suggests that 
‘more fragile special guardianships were being sanctioned by the courts following Re B-S’.128  
Relatives with no previous relationship with, or even knowledge of, the child were preferred129  with 
supervision orders added for risky arrangements. In response, the Department for Education 
commissioned further research on the use of special guardianship and consulted on whether 
changes were needed in assessments of potential special guardians.130 Some local authority and 
Cafcass staff commented that standards had been lowered following Re B-S  and there were no clear 
criteria for making special guardianship orders.131 Also, that the courts allowed insufficient time for 
assessments in order to complete cases within 26 weeks and were ‘over-focused’ on keeping 
children within their families.132 Regulations were enacted to strengthen special guardianship 
assessments and similar provisions for other assessments were included in the Children and Social 
Work Act 2017.133 
Local authority lawyers and managers responded to the decision in Re B-S by asking social workers 
to rewrite care plans and advising against applications for care or placement orders where evidence 
was not thought sufficient to support such an intervention. In doing so they were making their own 
assessment of what the courts required. Mnookin and Kornauser coined the phrase ‘bargaining in 
the shadow of the law’ for the practice of lawyers negotiating from the perspective of what they 
expected the courts to decide.134  The ‘bargaining’ was not simply limited to interaction with lawyers 
for the other party to a dispute, it impacted on the advice lawyers gave to clients and the ir own 
litigation strategies.   Lawyers’ actions were shaped by local court practice and by their clients’ 
willingness to accept risk, at least as much as the by facts of a case.135 These observations are equally 
relevant to lawyers acting for parents in care proceedings and children’s services department 
lawyers, whose client is not simply the social worker or manager giving instructions but the local 
                                                                 
126 Department for Education (2015) Children looked after in England (including adoption and care leavers) 
year ending 31 March 2015, SFR 34. This figure under-estimates the number of SGOs in care proceedings 
because it only includes children subject to an ICO or a s.20 agreement when the SGO is made. Those are with 
an interim supervision or child arrangements order during proceedings are excluded. 
127 J Harwin et al, (2016) A national study of the usage of supervision orders and special guardianship over time 
(2007-2016) Briefing paper no 1: Special guardianship orders, Brunel University and Lancaster University 
available at http://bit.ly/1RYBQlA  (29th March 2017). 
128 Research in Practice, (2015) Impact of the Family Justice Reforms on Front-line Practice Phase Two: Special 
Guardianship Orders Research report, Department for Education, 9. 
129 Ibid 11.  Reported judgments provide some examples: Re M’ P-P [2015] EWCA Civ 584 and Re W [2016] 
EWCA Civ 793 (both overturned and remitted on appeal); Re LG (A Child) [2015] EWFC 52; London Borough of X 
v KD 2016 WL 04261451.  
130 Department for Education (2015) Special guardianship review: report on findings Government consultation 
response available at https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/special-guardianship-review  (30th 
March 2017. 
131 Research in Practice (2015), (n 128 above), 22. This view was rejected as misconceived by Munby P in Re R 
[2014] EWCA Civ 1625, 43. 
132 Research in Practice (2015), (n 128 above). 
133  Special Guardianship (Amendment) Regulations 2016 (2016 No 111); Children and Social Work Act 2017, s. 
8. 
134 R Mnookin and M Kornhauser ‘Bargaining in the shadow of the law: The case of divorce’ [1979] Current 
Legal Problems 65. 
135 A Sarat and W Felstiner (1986) ‘Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office’, Law and Society Review, 
20,1, 93-134; L Mather, C McEwan and R Maiman (2001) Divorce lawyers at work Oxford: OUP. 
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authority.136   The sharp reduction in placement orders was due to the combination of fewer 
applications by local authorities and greater judicial reluctance to make orders. That the numbers 
continued to fall suggests that neither local authority professionals (lawyers and social workers) nor 
judges had a common understanding about the circumstances which make adoption appropriate 
now. This view is supported by variation between courts in the proportion of different orders 
granted in care cases.137 The focus in Re B-S on structure, of social work evidence and judgments, 
appears to have left all decision-makers and advisers less clear about when adoption is the right 
plan, and the large number of appeals has done little to clarify this as each is limited to its specific 
facts. By allowing appeals where the child’s circumstances appeared to necessitate adoption, the 
Court of Appeal made the issue of intervention less clear.138 
Tackling the disruptive effects of Re B-S 
In February 2014, a letter expressing concern at the consequences flowing from Re B-S was sent to 
the President of the Family Division, all Designated family judges, heads of local authority legal 
services, Cafcass managers and officials in the Department for Education, the Ministry of Justice and 
the Welsh Government.  The authors, Andrew Webb, Chair of the Association of Directors of 
Children’s Services and Anthony Douglas, Chief Executive of Cafcass were critical  of the courts’ 
rejection of ‘high quality analyses’ because of not ‘every single option’ for the child had been 
discussed, the priority being given to parents’ right to oppose , and the delay this was causing for 
children. Webb and Douglas stated that they, like judges were ‘committed to raising the standards of 
social work and … equally committed to re-building the confidence of social workers in their ability 
to deliver … to these exacting standards.’  They noted that their current guidance on social work 
evidence139 was compatible with Re B-S, and advised against a return to ‘more defensive social work’ 
because of the case. Such an intervention was unprecedented, extending beyond the social work 
and local authority communities to local judiciary, and setting out thinly veiled complaints about 
judges’ inability to recognise the quality of social work assessments, a focus on form rather than 
content and the disruption of reforms to reduce delay in care proceedings. There was no direct 
public response to this letter from the judiciary but in his next View140  Munby P noted that revisions 
had been made in the Cafcass and ADCS social work evidence templates to make them compatible 
with Re B-S. 
The Adoption Leadership Board (ALB), which is appointed by Ministers and has responsibility for 
facilitating the implementation of government policy on adoption also sought to counter the 
damaging effect of Re B-S. Discussions between the Board, the Department for Education and the 
Family Justice Board concluded that the reduction placement order applications was due to ‘a 
significant misinterpretation’ of case law.141  Therefore, in November 2014, the ALB issued guidance 
on the correct interpretation of Re B-S.142  This document sought to correct misconceptions (‘myths’) 
                                                                 
136 J Pearce et al (2011) Just following instructions? Bristol, School of Law, Bristol University; J Dickens (2005) 
‘Being “the epitome of reason”: the challenges for lawyers and social workers in child care proceedings’, 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 19, 1, 73-101, 
137 J Masson, J Dickens, L Garside, K Bader and J Young, (2017) How is the PLO working? What is its impact on 
court process and outcome? http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed176043 (30th March 2017). 
138 For example, in Re T [2014] EWCA Civ 929 an appeal against a placement order was allowed where the 
parents were both serving long sentences for offences of violence, cf Re N-S [2017] EWCA Civ 1121. 
139 Cafcass and ADCS, ‘Good practice for social work practised in the Family Courts’, Issued in April  2013. 
140 Munby P, View from the President’s Chambers No 10, February 2014. 
141 Letter from Sir Martin Narey circulated with the ‘myth buster’ document, November 2014.  
142 Adoption Leadership Board (2014) The impact of court judgments on adoption  what judgments do and do 
not say, Department for Education. 
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about recent decisions and to re-establish a more positive approach to adoption whilst emphasising 
that the provision of ‘expert, high quality, evidence-based analysis of all realistic options … and the 
arguments for and against each of these options.’143 It was a myth that Re B-S had changed adoption 
law, required consideration of all alternatives to adoption, or fostering or special guardianship to be 
pursued instead; adoption planning did not have to be delayed because adoption was ‘a last resort’; 
and the 26 week timetable did not apply to proceedings for placement orders.144 The document also 
noted that opposing adoption had not been made easier, the test remained the welfare of the child 
throughout life.145  
The Adoption Leadership Board’s document, accompanied by a carefully worded letter which 
suggested but did not expressly claim judicial support, was publicised through adoption organisation 
websites and widely circulated, including to all local family justice boards.146 The letter stated, ‘Sir 
James Munby, President of the Family Division … has seen this document and is supportive of its aim 
of dispelling the myths that have arisen.’147 On this occasion  the President responded publicly, ‘This 
document appears to be directed primarily at social workers and, appropriately, not to the judges. It 
has been the subject of some discussion in family justice circles. I need to make clear that its content 
has not been endorsed by the judiciary.’148 
Rowing back from Re B-S 
Despite the reluctance to climb down, the Court of Appeal (including Munby P) clearly felt it 
necessary to backtrack. The family judges in the Court of Appeal revisited Re B-S in Re R,149  a case 
where the judge accepted that adoption was the only realistic option and made care and placement 
orders. In giving judgment for the court on the case, McFarlane LJ noted that concerns about Re B-S 
had been discussed by the judges and with counsel. He comprehensively rejected each of the 
counsel for the mother’s points on the judge’s supposed failure to apply the standards required by 
Re B-S. Whilst McFarlane LJ did not go as far as saying the appeal was totally without merit, the 
rejection of all grounds for appeal and the conclusion that the judge had no alternative but 
adoption150 raises the question why leave to appeal had been given to such a clear-cut case. The 
Court of Appeal appears to have commandeered a passing case as the vehicle for its message on 
standards for care plans and judgments.151  
In his judgment in Re R, the President focused on Re B-S, its meaning and effect. He noted the 
‘widespread uncertainty, misunderstanding and confusion’ following Re B-S which required ‘urgent’ 
action.152 He dismissed as ‘myths’ suggestions that adoption plans were subject to ‘higher hurdles’ or 
required more evidence ‘emphasising, with as much force as possible, that Re B-S was not intended 
to change and has not changed the law….it was primarily directed at practice.’153 Throughout his 
judgment, Munby P restated the points he had made in Re B-S, explaining them slightly more and 
                                                                 
143 ALB (2014), para 5. 
144 ALB (2014), paras 7-24. 
145 ALB (2014), para 34. 
146 It was sent to all  designated family judges as the judgment in Re B-S had been. 
147 Narey, above n 136. 
148 Re R [2014] EWCA Civ 1625, para 70. 
149 [2014] EWCA Civ 1625.  
150  Given the mother’s excessive drinking, continuing violent relationship, the child’s fear of her and the any 
alternative family carers. 
151 The judge was criticised for including an unnecessary step in his decision, para 20 .  
152 Re R [2014] EWCA Civ 1625, para 41. The judgment was published 9 months after Webb and Douglas’ letter 
and 15 months after Re B-S. 
153 Paras 44 and 56. 
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linking them to subsequent decisions. He stressed that decision-making was about substance not 
structure or form, drawing back, as McFarlane LJ had done, from the view that a linear structure 
made a decision appealable.154  Also, ‘“Nothing else will do”155 did not mean that everything else had 
to be considered.’156 Floyd LJ agreed with both judgments adding that judges had to explain why the 
selected option was best for the child in a way that ‘was able easily to be respected by an appellate 
court.’157 The overall message was that Re B-S was right; it had been misinterpreted but not by the 
judiciary.  
Re R focused on correcting misunderstandings in care proceedings decisions but did not reconsider 
leave to oppose adoption or making orders in favour of relatives in respect of children who were 
already in long-term placements.158  The Court of Appeal had the opportunity to consider these 
issues in cases in 2015 and 2016; McFarlane LJ gave the main judgment in each of them.159 Decisions 
to favour placement with a relative unknown to the child, over continuing care (and adoption) were 
overturned and cases remitted for rehearing. McFarlane LJ used his judgments to correct 
misconceptions, which had obviously diverted children’s guardians, experts and judges from the 
required, balanced consideration of the child’s welfare . Children had no ‘right’ to be brought up in 
their ‘natural family’; a relative who was able to provide care had no right to do so; and there was no 
presumption in favour of care in the natural family which trumped an existing placement.160 He went 
further in criticising use of the phrase ‘nothing else will do.’  It was ‘meaningless and potentially 
dangerous’ if taken alone.161 This was the clearest acknowledgement that Lady Hale’s dicta in Re B 
and the guidance in Re B-S had drawn attention away from the status quo, the child’s attachments, 
which were fundamental in assessing welfare.162 
This recent case law illustrates how tenacious disruptive judgments can be. Soundbites, dicta and 
guidelines acquire a status that they could not claim as law.163 It is judicial reasoning that establishes 
precedent which amounts to law; lawyers and judges must engage in analysis and explain how and 
why law applies to other circumstances. Where provision have already been interpreted they cannot 
legitimately be given new meaning unless earlier decision can be shown to be wrong. The se 
interpretive processes necessarily raise questions about similarity and difference, continuity or 
change.  In contrast, dicta and guidelines shape behaviour in an altogether less thoughtful way, in 
the words of McFarlane LJ as if they are ‘a hyperlink’164 to the correct decision. In this way, Re B-S led 
                                                                 
154 Paras 18 and 69. McFarlane LJ repeated this point in Re F [2015] EWCA Civ 882, paras 45-50, where he 
acknowledged responsibility for its use to challenge decisions and reflected that the holistic approach was no 
more than ‘the old-fashioned balancing exercise’. Appeals are stil l being allowed in placement order cases on 
the basis that the judge’s reasoning was ‘l inear’: Re H [2016] EWCA Civ 1131. 
155 Re B [2013] UKSC 33, per Lady Hale at para 198. 
156 Re R [2014] EWCA Civ 1625, per Munby P at para 60. The social worker in Re R had not dared to exclude any 
possibility, even residential care throughout childhood, for a child aged 2 years, a practice contrary to 
International standards!  
157 Re R [2014] EWCA Civ 1625 at para 38. 
158 Munby P’s judgment touched on adoption, repeating incorrectly ‘ours is one of the few countries in Europe 
which allows adoption without parental consent’, para 41 and a truncated quotation from Y v UK (2012) ECtHR 
4547/10, para 134.  
159 Re M’P-P [2015] EWCA Civ 584; Re H [2015] EWCA Civ 1284; Re W [2016] EWCA Civ 793. 
160 Re H at para 89; Re W at para 70-71. 
161 Re W at para 68. 
162 Re M’P-P at para 47-51; Re W at para 67. 
163 Even when correcting Munby P’s misinterpretation of Children Act 1989, s.20 in Re N [2015] EWCA Civ 1112 
Leveson LJ accepted that it could stil l  be ‘good practice’: London Borough of Hackney v Williams [2017] EWCA 
Civ 26, para 68. 
164 Re W at para 68. 
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appellants to focus on the form of evidence and judgments (particularly linearity), which simplified 
the task of challenging decisions and took the focus away from the parent’s parenting and the child’s 
needs. Whilst this strategy might not ultimately succeed in achieving re-unification, it provided time 
for the parent to demonstrate their positive qualities, just as seeking further expert reports had 
done before the 26 week timetable. For the Court of Appeal, focusing on form avoided a need to 
consider the ultimate merits of a case, and thus making the momentous decisions required in care 
and adoption proceedings. Indeed, having concluded that the existing evidence was inadequate they 
could only remit the case. Soundbites also skewed views and practices in favour of family 
placements and against adoption, with limited attention to relationships, the quality of care and the 
durability of arrangements. 
Whilst the response to Re B-S was immediate, and this added to its disruptive effect, it is taking far 
longer to reset the balance. In part, this is because the notions generated by cases have taken root in 
the minds of some professionals.  The contested nature of adoption means that views that it is, or 
should be, more difficult have resonance with those who already view it  negatively.165 Loss of 
confidence about assessments and judgments is also a factor for local authorities, social workers, 
Cafcass officers and judges because of the highly critical tone of the original judgment and the 
repeated fault finding in subsequent cases. For those who were already critical of adoption or local 
authority practice, Re B-S and subsequent cases provided confirmation that the President of the 
Family Division agreed. 
Conclusions 
In his report for 2015, the Lord Chief Justice remarked on the decline in placement orders, noting 
that the judiciary would welcome ‘reliable data’ which would cast light on whether this was due to 
fewer applications by local authorities or a ‘reduction in the number of cases where the Family Court 
allows adoption.’166 The available evidence indicates both fewer applications and a decline in the 
proportion achieving orders. This was triggered by the Court of Appeal’s decision is Re B-S and the 
cases that followed. Judicial decisions are never confined to the court room whether judges are 
applying the law or making policy. Judgments can have disruptive effect because of this. Rather than 
seek to allocate responsibility, more relevant questions are whether Re B-S has raised the standards 
of social work evidence, whether this could have been achieved without the attendant disruption 167 
and whether decisions now achieve justice for all the parties involved, are in children’s best 
interests. 
The Family Justice Review remarked on the lack of management data on the system’s operation ; and 
the lack of trust amongst the various organisations and individuals in the Family Justice System.168 
Both these are relevant to the capacity of judgments to be disruptive. Better data on care 
proceedings could have provided a clearer picture of decision-making, providing a better 
understanding of problems before any attempts are made to address them. A case for reform, 
whether of law or practice, ought to be based on firmer foundations than a few recent cases that 
reached the Court of Appeal. It would also enable the effects of reforms, including through case law 
                                                                 
165 McFarlane LJ used the term ‘forced adoption’ in his Bridget Lindley Memorial Lecture to mean non -
consensual adoption under the Children and Adoption Act 2002, although such orders comply with the 
European Convention on Human Rights, http://bit.ly/2nzsH8g  (30th March 2017). 
166 Lord Chief Justice’s Report 2015, (2016) Judiciary of England and Wales, 15. 
167 For example, by co-operative working called for by the Family Justice Review (2011) and the House of Lords 
Select Committee on Adoption (2012-13 HL 127). 
168 Family Justice Review (2011) Interim Report para 2.52. 
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to be tracked, allowing for early discussion about whether corrective action is required, rather than 
waiting until beliefs or misconceptions have become entrenched.  
Lack of trust was at the root of the use of Re B-S as means of improving practice, and the actions of 
the Adoption Leadership Board and the President of the Family Division in seeking to correct the 
misconceptions it generated. The Court of Appeal was not prepared in September 2013 to trust local 
authorities or lower court judges to deliver work of a sufficient standard within shorter proceedings, 
whether this was because they were unhappy about the imposition of the timetable169 or because 
they believed that standards were already too low170 is unclear. However, both McFarlane LJ’s and 
Ryder J’s answers to the House of Lords Adoption Committee and Munby P’s lecture the Judicial 
College PLO training both suggest that decision-making standards were not a concern at the end of 
2012 and the beginning of 2013. It is also clear that when the Adoption Leadership Board published 
its corrective guidance it was not able to establish sufficient trust for any form of joint statement 
with the judiciary. Despite the strong resonance between the Guidance and Re R, including the 
language, Munby P publicly rejected it, undermining rather than developing trust. 
Re B-S and the subsequent guidance provide a clear illustration of the continuing lack of a system for 
family justice. The President’s statements in Re B-S and Re N were not about law but about practice 
and needed to be responded to by social workers, their managers, l ocal authority lawyers, Cafcass 
and the judiciary. The leaders of all agencies and organisations needed to reach agreement about 
practice standards: what could realistically be required given the resources (staff and time) available, 
and a ‘good enough’ minimum; how to assess standards by reference to content not form; and the 
actions to be taken if these are not met. A systems approach171 is required to ensure that demands 
on one part of the system do not undermine standards in another. The family justice system will not 
function if local authorities and Cafcass cannot meet the standards the judiciary demand, nor if 
courts make orders irrespective of the child’s interests or in the hope that things will work out for 
the best.  Establishing agreement about practice is challenging and time-consuming, interdisciplinary 
work, which is more difficult with formalistic views of judicial independence172 and without a history 
of co-operative working.  However, using readily understood language and planning implementation 
would make be more effective. Without trust and an effective system, which the judiciary accept 
does not compromise their independence, the judiciary will continue to resort to judgments to 
impose their views on practice. Where these are interpreted as imposing new demands they will be 
disruptive.  
In his discussion of judicial guidance, Roger McCarthy comments that ‘if prior judicial guidelines or 
general approaches are allowed to predetermine the outcome of individual discretionary cases, 
there is a real risk that the trial process which underpins … justice …[is] reduced to a procedural 
stage show.’173 The examination of disruptive judgments through the example of Re B-S 
demonstrates that where guidance is presented as, or taken for, law and applied to an area which is 
frequently before the courts there is also a risk of wide scale disruption to professional practice, 
decision-making and the lives of those caught up in litigation.  
                                                                 
169 As the minister suggested, Telegraph 12 November 2014, coinciding with the publi cation of the Adoption 
Leadership Board guidance.  
170 The ostensible reason for giving guidance in Re B-S and for allowing the appeals in Re H, Re W [2013] EWCA 
Civ 1177. 
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The idea of judicial restraint in law making remains strong despite the general acceptance that 
judges do more than merely state the law. It should apply equally to the development of practice 
guidance by judges. Predictable application is fundamental for the rule of law. Where judges use 
their position deliberately to force change through judgments where it is not open to them to 
develop the law they act disruptively and undermine the rule of law. Controlling disruptive 
judgments requires judicial self-control – avoiding the abuse of power – and using alternative means 
to address practice problems that judges or others identify. The Family Justice Council might have 
been expected to fulfil this role but developing interdisciplinary guidance requires a better balance 
between the relevant disciplines and a clearer relationship to the family justice system. Improving 
practice necessitates interdisciplinary and inter-agency discussion, which judges should be parties to 
but not seek to dominate. There must be consultation (as normally occurs with statutory guidance 
on child care practice) and preparation for its introduction.  
Setting out the ways and means of using judgments to disruptive effect is intended to put these 
practices under the spotlight, not to encourage them but to highlight the damaging effects where 
judges operate outside the rule of law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
